FALLUJAH -- I was sure he would cancel the meeting. The night was intensely dusty. Blizzard-like conditions made driving hazardous, even at the single-digit speed limits posted in some areas around the Marine base. But the Mayor of Fallujah defied the elements, penetrated a gauntlet of security checkpoints, and showed up on base to talk with the Americans anyway. The ePRT members and one Marine gratefully set a table for him: water, Fanta, and individually wrapped Otis Spunkmeyer muffins, each secure and inviolate in a shield of plastic.
The ePRT -- the crew of American diplomats and development experts tasked with fixing Fallujah -- know the Mayor well, and were equally impressed at his resolve to meet. His determination turned out to be the result of one pressing issue. He had heard that the Marines had awarded contract to an Iraqi business that would destroy Camp Bahariya, the US base nearest the city. Bahariya abuts Camp Fallujah, which the Marines already vacated and turned over to the Iraqi security forces. The Mayor wanted to know if the contract could go not to this private company but to the city of Fallujah, or to anyone who would guarantee that the work of physically tearing the place up was done by Fallujah residents themselves. Give us jobs, "We hear there is a contract," the Mayor said. "We should use it employ people. We can possibly use it to, you know, influence security" -- by getting young proto-insurgents working, and thus extinguishing the terrorist instinct with that universal salve, hard cash.
The Mayor, I was told, had never kowtowed to the Americans, and indeed he seemed to have a bad attitude. The bad attitude made him an ideal partner, because when he felt disgust he showed it. I would have felt disgust too, if like the Mayor I had walked and driven through gusts of dust just to hear the response the ePRT and Marine representative had to offer.
"We anticipate one more contract for clean-up," the Marine said. He then described in detail, pitiless in his use of acronyms, the Everest of bureaucracy the Mayor would need to ascend to apply for that contract. "That contract will go to the MNF-West level and be put into JCCS like all the other contracts." The translator botched the job, and the JCCS (Joint Contingency Contract System, a Web-based program to register bids from contractors) came out as JCC (Joint Coordination Center, a building meant to be a hub for security and development). "Could we not make a special case," he asked, for security purposes? Short answer: not a chance. After two or three more acronyms the Mayor's patience dwindled to zero. While the Americans tried to recover, he picked dust-bunnies off his formerly white striped shirt, and within minutes he pronounced the meeting past its use.
What could have saved this encounter? It sounds awfully fatalistic to say that the answer is nothing, but I had the feeling of watching two incommensurate forces collide in an ugly way. The Marine had no authority to make an exception on contract of that size, nor would an exception have been in keeping with the desire for transparency for which the JCCS bureaucracy existed. And the Mayor appeared to think -- whatever his deeper intentions for that contract; perhaps he wanted it for himself -- that he had offered the Americans an unadulterated good, a way to let them leave Fallujah gracefully, with the city's residents docile for a few months later, and fond at least in their memories of a final paycheck from their occupiers.
If an interaction that simple has (in those three depressingly ubiquitous words) no easy solution, the many, many more complex ones are truly hopeless.
This is an interesting article but it over simplifies the situation. I have served in Iraq and have attended numerous meetings like the one described in the article. These meetings go on every day in every corner of Iraq and are an important part of our efforts there. Mr. Wood’s account is reflective of the meetings I have personally attended but he portrays the situation as a simple one. I would have to disagree.
First, in Iraq when you are the person dispersing funds, everyone wants to be your friend, especially mayors, council men, Sons of Iraq, etc. They see these Coalition Forces representatives as a cash cow – their personal cash cow. Mr. Wood implies that the mayor was seeking jobs and money for his community, which he may have been. However, it has been my experience when local leaders made this type of plea that the bids submitted for the contract are often from close relatives of the local leader. Coalition Forces require that a number of bids be submitted and inevitable the mayor or local leader knows three or four “contractors” from his area that have bids ready and promise to hire local workers, i.e. the leader’s relatives and friends. Often, the bids will offer to do the work for an exorbitant amount, with the exception of one (which will still be extremely high) with the intent of influencing Coalition Forces to take the lowest bid. Upon close inspection it is often clear that all the bids have been prepared by the same individual. It is clear case of corruption and bid rigging. I found this to be a common practice during my tenure in Iraq. When challenged on the authenticity or the outrageously high prices, the Iraqis would often mention the security situation, jobs or some other contrived excuse for why the local council/leader should be awarded the contract. (I do not mean to down play the importance of job creation, and economic development efforts by ePRT, Civil Affairs teams, and others in fighting counter insurgency. In fact, I believe these are key instruments in fighting irregular warfare.)
This is where the issue becomes complicated and Mr. Woods’ article falls short. Let me explain, if the U.S. awards the contract to the local leadership it may send the message to the local populace that their government is corrupt and that the U.S. is a willing partner in this dishonesty - if indeed, the bid is awarded to a relative or friend of the local leader. In fighting a counter insurgency, the support of the local populace is crucial and you do not want to undermine your efforts by being seen as corrupt or in league with leaders that are more interested in lining their pockets than they are in looking out for the their communities.
Many Iraqis also see the awarding of contracts to local leaders as an example of Coalition Forces’ lack of concern for the average citizen. Often, those in power in Iraq are the most affluent. When Coalition Forces award contracts to these individuals and not to an “average” citizen it can send the message that Coalition Forces do not have any genuine concern for the Iraqi people. This can also cause resentment. The citizen on the street sees this as a lack of interest by Coalition Forces to truly better the average person. Once again, this perception can be detrimental in counter insurgency warfare.
You must also consider where the money paid for these projects will ultimately end up. The U.S. certainly does not want to award contracts to individuals that will funnel the profits to insurgents. If there are reasons to suspect that a leader has ties to an insurgent group, then no money should flow through that person or the governing body they oversee. Of course, there are no guarantees that the monies will avoid nefarious and dubious individuals, regardless of the amount of care and due diligence exercised.
This is not a simple matter of awarding the contract to the mayor of Fallujah. It is complicated. For every reason you should award the contract there is a reason why you shouldn’t. In my attempt to be brief, I may have sacrificed clarity, but the bottom line is awarding contracts in Iraq is a weapon of war. Coalition Forces in Iraq are fighting a counter insurgency, which history teaches us is never as simple as it seems.
Though MLC claims to have sat in a few meetings his reply to the article is typical of someone who sits behind a desk all day, it shows how little he actually knows about the process of awarding contracts. Number one the whole process is desinged in an about way bring in funds and aid the local economy, while restricting AQI'S ability to influence local Iraqi's through poverty.
Number two the three contract rule only applies to contract submitted through the Fallujah Chamber of commerce and is relegated to non essential projects. However and this is the jist of what the Mayor was getting to is that 'Security Projects' take a quicker step up the ladder and do not need to be approved by the chamber of commerce, city council EPRT, nor MNF-WEST. More than likely the contract went to a company that has been without the benefit of any type of contract bid, for Fallujans, and that is at the heart of the matter of getting the run around from a Marine who is clueless to how Commerce actually works
This sounds like Detroit to me. As a lifetime resident of Michigan, it's in the news all the time. We have the same kind of crap going on; a 'king' in plush exile, self aggrandising city council, "pay to play" in Fallujah woud be called by its proper name; ie. bribery. Failing schools, with no record of where the millions went - the record of endless. The only thing we don't have is American soldiers on the streets. The drug wars make up for the lack of an actual war - war. My area of residendce is Pontiac, a smaller, poorer version. It seems the rot goes from bottom to the top. The sad part is that people just adapt and try to get on with their lives, although out of state emmigration is taking its toll. If there is no work, you have to look somewhere else. Keep up the good work.