Aug 25 2009, 9:52PM
Christina Romer's "More Than $100 Billion" Mistake
Christina Romer, in her speech that I have been blogging critically about, said that the government had by the end of the second quarter of this year (June 30) "spent" more than $100 billion in stimulus money. The official stimulus web site, recovery.gov, has $61 billion, and one of my critics says "about $60 billion." Other critics say that the official figure is too low, because it omits "tax reductions," which one critic calls "tax rebates." These critics say that the missing figure for tax relief is $40 billion, so gets Romer up to at least the $100 billion of her "more than $100 billion."
The figure of $60 billion of $61 billion is too high. According to recovery.gov, the $61 billion figure is as of last week--seven weeks after the end of the second quarter. Since the rate of stimulus expenditures is said to be accelerating, the number for the second quarter is undoubtedly significantly lower. This makes the $40 billion in tax relief all the more important to Romer's argumente And if that figure consisted of actual rebate checks, or reductions in current withholding, then of course it should be included in the total outlays of the stimulus program. But in fact very little of it consists of rebates, which is why it is not recorded on the government's website as stimulus money spent and is why Romer should not have said that by the end of the second quarter the government had "spent" "more than $100 billion" in stimulus money. Almost all the tax relief provided for in the stimulus bill consists of reductions in taxes by individuals and businesses. The question is how many of those reductions have resulted in increased cash flow to taxpayers. If, for example, the reduction is reflected in reduced withholding, or a reduced payment of estimated tax by people who filed estimated returns on April 15, it should be counted as stimulus spending; it puts money in people's pockets. If it merely reduces their future tax liability, it does not. All that is certain is that not all that $40 billion in tax relief is stimulus money; not all, and, at a guess, not most, put money in people's pockets before the second quarter ended.
That is a surprising oversight of Romer and her allied macroeconomists, and I am guessing that they will regroup and argue that just the prospect of greater after-tax income in the future can have a stimulus effect. And I agree! As I have said repeatedly, I support the stimulus. My criticism of Romer's speech, and of her defenders (apart from their incivility, surprising in those of my critics who are university professors), is that it and they exaggerate the probable effect on the economy of the limited amount of stimulus spending as of the end of the second quarter. To me, the significance of the stimulus is its effect on the confidence of business and consumers (that is a Keynesian point, and I am an "old Keynesian," which is to say a fan of the General Theory), and that effect is to a considerable degree, I should think, independent of the schedule of stimulus spending. So yes, if businesses and consumers know that they are getting tax reductions, this may well affect their current spending, because they know their after-tax income will rise. The effect, however, cannot be quantified.
So what would be the most accurate statement about the effect of the stimulus is as follows: since the financial collapse of last September, the government has taken a number of steps to arrest the economic decline. The joint effect of these steps (credit easing, bank bailouts, auto bailouts, stimulus package, mortgage relief, etc.) has almost certainly been positive, and I would guess strongly positive. But the separate effect of each of the components cannot be quantified. The stimulus package is a major component of the government's overall recovery program, and there are theoretical reasons for believing that it had a signficant effect in advance of actual expenditures of stimulus funds by the recipients. Our inability to quantify its effect should not be a ground of criticism.
Paul Krugman has now chimed in, concurring with Professor DeLong's claim that I understated the effect of stimulus sending through June 30 by a factor of 16. DeLong's analysis of the effect of the stimulus was based on the premise that $100 billion dollars of stimulus moneys were not only received through June 30 but actually spent by the recipients; and we now know that that is a wild exaggeration. On the assumption that all that money was spent in the second quarter, the stimulus was approximately 2.9 percent of GDP for that quarter (he uses the figure 2.6 percent). Considering that an unknown but probably significant fraction of the so-called $60 billion in state aid was not even disbursed in the second quarter and that of the fraction that was disbursed only a modest fraction in all likelihood was actually spent by recipients of the aid rather than retained in state treasuries or saved by the individual or business recipients, and that an even smaller fraction of the $40 billion in tax relief was actually received by taxpayers rather than accrued or, again, saved, the assumption that $100 billion (let alone more than $100 billion) was actually spent on goods and services is a gross exaggeration. (DeLong reversed the fractions; he thought that $60 billion was tax relief--of course if that were right, his assumption that $100 billion was actually spent in the second quarter would be even more extravagant. But it is wrong.)
Remember that Romer herself speculated "that households are initially using the tax cut mainly to increase their saving and pay off debt." Yet all the stimulus money disbursed in the second quarter similarly consisted of transfers, not of investments, and no one seems to know how much was actually spent rather than squirreled away during the second quarter. People tend to save rather than spend transitory (i.e., windfall) income (the tendency Romer herself acknowledged with reference to tax relief), and all the transfer payments authorized by the stimulus program are transitory. Romer says that public works (she calls them "direct investments," but the meaning is the same) "have short-run effects roughly 60 percent larger than tax cuts." She doesn't indicate where she gets the number, but it is further evidence that she believes that transfer payments are not as efficient in stimulating economic activity as public works are. And there was not yet any significant spending of stimulus moneys on public works in the second quarter.
Moreover, given the inevitable lag between the disbursement and the expenditure of disbursed funds by the recipient of the disbursement, disbursements made toward the end of the second quarter could not possibly have affected output and employment in that quarter, other than psychologically, and hence unquantifiably.
No one seems to know the true figure of stimulus money actually spent (not saved, not sitting state treasuries, not accrued) in the second quarter. If it was as much as $25 billion, which is roughly two-thirds of one percent of that quarter's GDP, I would be surprised. That is not a negligible amount, but whether it would explain much or all or a little of the reduction in the rate of decline of GDP from the first to the second quarter is unproved, and probably unprovable. So much else was happening in the economy in the second quarter; separating out the causal effect of one development that may have contributed to the decline in the rate of decline of output in the second quarter is probably impossible, but in any event has not been attempted. The one thing we can be certain of is that, Christina Romer and her phalanx of defenders to the contrary notwithstanding, "more than $100 billion" of the stimulus money had not been "spent" ("absolutely going out the door," as she also put it) when the second quarter of 2009 ended on June 30.
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Richard A. Posner
Upon first reading, this is a much more thoughtful post. Thank you for sticking to the facts, such as they are. It will facilitate a more reasoned debate.
In my mind this particular debate is both too big and too small.
Too big because the backdrop is the expansive, complex, century-old, and politically loaded issue of the proper role for, and the potential effectiveness of, government action in an economic crisis. If parties to the discussion cannot agree on a set of goals or even the basic meaning or correct measures of the terms (for instance, "effectiveness" or "optimal result") then attempting a true, scholarly conversation between differing "schools" of thought borders on futile.
It is too small because it has become about the exactness of particular input numbers, but what we really care about here is the output; the effect of those inputs - of whatever value they happen to be - towards the improvement in the health of the overall economic environment. The key metric here is not the easily-measured difference in contraction between two consecutive (and very different) quarters, but the arduous estimation of the difference between a single quarter's performance and what would have been in the absence of the policy, or under the execution of an alternative policy.
Most everyone admits that the situation is incredibly complex, and that each crisis is in some way sui generis and will respond to action in a unique fashion, and that therefore it is profoundly difficult to tease out the exact relationship except to say that it almost certainly had some net positive effect on short-term aggregate demand, employment, and confidence.
But this is not saying much.
Deficit spending, of whatever amount or fraction of GDP, no matter what the money is spent on, or to whom it is given, or how its expenditure is paced, is bound to have some positive short-term effects so long as anything less than 100% of it is hoarded and idled without any effect on consumption - an unlikely scenario.
One can therefore declare victory or success no matter what happens. It is a lot like declaring one's goal as, "creating or saving X-million jobs". It is a false metric, rhetorically deceptive in its apparent exactness since what could have been will always be debatable. If the GDP-growth rate increases, you can take credit for much of it since the exact contribution borders on the unknowable. If it contracts, you can still claim "it would have been a lot worse". It's near impossible for critics to persuasively demonstrate the error of these claims even if they had truth on their side.
There problem remains of whether we're getting a long-term bang for our short-term bucks. There is no question of whether there is "some bang right now", or whether some of that bang comes from these bucks. The question is whether we'll think we acted wisely in retrospect, but we'll probably be just as stumped as to how to make this decision in the future.
As an example: If a crisis unstimulated would have erased 10% of GDP in two years, but yielded a 5% growth rate for the next 8, a decade after the crisis began the GDP would have grown to (0.9)*(1.05)^8 = 1.33, or a gain of a third in ten years despite starting with a two-year depression.
If the alternative stimulated crisis would have gone down only 5% in those two years as a bad recession instead of depression, but the burden of debt resulted in slightly slower 4% growth, then the projected GDP is (0.95)*(1.04)^8 = 1.30. This is slightly less than the above result, but it's by no means obvious that it's a clearly "worse" result if, in the meantime, significant stress and suffering (and political instability) was avoided.
How to estimate these figures and weigh these issues gets back to the "too big" debate above. I can only hope we make some incremental progress this time around.
As I already commented yesterday (And I've noticed that it has been posted. I wonder why?) Posner's spending figures are incorrect and this can be verified on recovery.org. Justin Wolfers threw in his two cents worth on this today:
"John Maynard Keynes reportedly said, “When the facts change, I change my mind.” My advice to Posner: when your understanding of the facts change, don’t keep attacking the facts, change your mind."
http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/28/posner-redux/#comment-491961
I've been researching the $40 billion tax figure and realize I made two *major* mistake earlier. (So in the spirit of Keynes, I'm changing my mind.) Here are my two mistakes:
1) The Economic Recovery Payments appear on the direct spending side and so are included in the recovery.gov figures. I treated it like a tax cut.
2) Only $23.4 billion is budgeted for he Make Work Pay Credit in FY 2009, not $58 billion as I stated yesterday.
On July 8th in congressional testimony Robert L. Nabors Deputy Director of the OMB stated:
"As of June 30, almost $201 billion, or approximately 26 percent, of all Recovery Act funding had been obligated or distributed. This includes $157.7 billion of obligations, representing all major agencies-of which over a third has been outlaid-and $43.2 billion of tax relief."
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/testimony/deputy_070809_arra.pdf
On August 7th the Democratic Policy Committee stated:
"The Department of Treasury's Office of Tax Analysis estimates that, through the end of June, approximately $43.2 billion in tax relief has already been made available through Recovery Act tax provisions for Making Work Pay, other individual credits, energy incentives, tax incentives for businesses, and COBRA. [The White House, 7/15/09]"
http://dpc.senate.gov/docs/fs-111-1-109.pdf
Let's look at each of these provisions separately. Evidently, based on Treasury/IRS/Congressional websites, all pay out immediately through a refund or through reduced withholding. Here are my best estimates on how much was obligated/distributed through the end of the second quarter based on congressional testimony, BEA data and JCT analysis.
1) Make Work Pay
Nabors said that $15 billion in Make Work Pay went out by the end of June. However according to the BEA $0.93 billion went out in March and $4.15 billion went out in each of the three following months for a total of $13.4 billion.
2)Other Individual Incentives
a) Expanded Tax Break for 2009 First-time Buyers
$1.4 billion
b) Sales Tax Deduction for Vehicle Purchases $340 million
c) Exclude up to $2,400 of unemployment
insurance benefits from gross income.
$470 million
3)Energy Incentives
$160 million
4)Tax Incentives for Business
a)Bonus Depreciation
$320 million
b)Carryback of Net operating Losses
$16.25 billion
c)Deferral of Income from Debt Writedowns
$4 billion
5)Cobra
$4.8 billion
The JCT analysis is here:
http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=1231
So the total equals $42.8 billion (using Nabor's Make Work Pay figure)which is pretty close to the official $43.2 billion figure.
I wish the administration would be as transparent with the tax expenditure figures as they have been with the direct spending figures. This is only having the unfortunate effect of aiding critics like Posner.
However, as you can see, it is entirely plausible that $40 billion ended up in the pockets of businesses and individuals by way of the Treasury Department by the end of June.
For whatever reason my comments are posting today. This is a repeat of some of what I said yesterday:
Everyone who has followed the Recovery Act remembers the figures. I googled and found this image of the cumulative spending as of June 26th:
http://picasaweb.google.com/lh/photo/IxLMoHa1yhg2s79U0kyYuQ?authkey=Gv1sRgCOWcs5m5waORKw&feat=embedwebsite
Note that it was $56.3 billion on that date. Furthermore I have no idea where Posner is getting the $61 billion figure because when you go to the site you can clearly see as of last week it was $84.6 billion:
http://www.recovery.gov/?q=content/report-progress
P.S. Menzie Chinn also posted on this article. You can link to his article through the link to the Justin Wolfers article above.