Sep 20 2009, 8:06PM

Financial Regulatory Reform: The Politics of Denial

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Two bad recent signs concerning the movement to reform financial regulation: The first is the first public meeting of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, created by Congress four months ago to investigate the causes of the financial crisis and report back at the end of next year. The commission has gotten off to a slow start, and even though only one member of the commission could (I believe, though I am not certain, and welcome correction) be described as a professional economist (Keith Hennessey), and even he is more a political operative, the commission has appointed as its executive director not an economist but a lawyer--a prosecutor in the California attorney general's office. And at its first public meeting members of the commission made statements which suggest that they will divide along the predictable political lines (six of the members are Democrats, four Republicans).

One can hope; but it seems unlikely that the commission will do a good job. It will look for crooks and frauds rather than for underlying causes, unless an underlying cause can be pinned to the tail of the politically party to which the pinner does not belong.

Meanwhile the Administration and the Fed plow ahead with their own programs of regulatory reform, without waiting for the commission's report--which may indicate how the commission is regarded by the government's economic leaders. The latest proposal, this one from inside the Fed, is that the Fed should issue regulations empowering it to regulate the compensation practices of all banks that belong to the Federal Reserve System and thus are under the Fed's regulatory aegis--and not just the compensation of senior executives but of all bank executives. The proposal goes beyond the Treasury Department's June 17 white paper, which proposed regulation of compensation only of executives of "Tier 1 Financial Holding Companies," which is to say the handful of major banks and other major financial institutions whose failure might trigger a general collapse of the financial system. The Fed proposal is more ambitious--and highly dubious. Where will the Fed find staff for such regulatory oversight? What is the need to regulate the compensation practices of small banks? And given Lucian Bebchuk's sensible suggestion (about which I have blogged) that if senior executives are compelled to be compensated in ways that would penalize them if their company got into trouble and needed a bailout they will be motivated to prevent their subordinates from taking risks that might trigger such consequences, why does the Fed think it has to reach down and review the methods by which banks compensate traders, loan officers, and other non-senior executives? Why can't that be left to properly incentivized senior management?

It seems that the Fed, and the government more broadly (including Congress), is in the psychological state known as "denial." Or that it is behaving like the drunk who, criticized for looking for his lost change under a lamppost far from where he had dropped it, explained that he was looking for it there because the light was better. Congress, and much of the public and media, can understand the financial crisis only in populist terms, as the product of the machinations of greedy, reckless, overpaid, perhaps criminal denizens of "Wall Street." Systemic causes of the financial crisis, such as unsound monetary policy, deregulation, lax regulation, regulators asleep at the switch, unsound economic theories, complacency, quirks of the tax code, deficits, Chinese trade policy, mindless governmental promotion of home ownership, and so forth, are beyond them. The government is willing to play to the ignorant partly because in a democracy popular views must always be treated deferentially; partly because (in all likelihood) it doesn't think that the people, the Congress, and the media (except for the most sophisticated financial journalists) can understand a serious economic analysis; and partly because the populist account conveniently deflects attention from the failures in which the current economic leaders of the nation were complicit in the run up to the crisis--unsound trade policy, excessive financial deregulation, lax regulation, complacency, lack of foresight, lack of contingency planning.

Of course if the officials who screwed up said they'd screwed up, the people and the Congress would be reluctant to entrust them with responsibility for redesigning the regulatory system. So they must find scapegoats, and where better than on "Wall Street"?

(Photo: Flickr User eflon)

Comments (4)

THE FCIC will undoubtedly take on the subject of officer salary since it inspires so much disgust and envy in the general population. But the problem with the "poorly designed compensation and incentives" argument is that many of the top executives of the large financial institutions were paid in shares and stock options and witnessed the wiping out (or nearly so) of their large fortunes, in addition to having their careers ended in shame and with their reputations destroyed.

Let's consider the list of the largest failed / zombie / distress acquisition banks (though you could just as easily ask the same about GM and Chrysler): Merrill Lynch, Countrywide, Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, AIG, Bear Sterns, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and IndyMac. Were all these firms compensating their executives and traders in some suicidal fashion?

More to the point - is it truly plausible that some kind of alternative compensation program would have led to the radically different management policies that would have been necessary to avoid these errors when the system that existed already punishes reckless failure so harshly?

On a simpler, political level - I think it will be hard for most citizens to understand the nature of the compensation argument in terms of cause and effect, "You mean, they all did these risky things - the things that eventually undid them altogether - because they were being paid too much?" It comports with a visceral dislike for the ways of Wall Street, but it fails the common sense test of resembling some familiar account of failure.

What really happened was the untethered optimism associated with the mass-psychology of a housing bubble fueled by cheap credit on the easiest possible terms.

One of the things I hope to see emerge from the FCIC's work will be some distillation of this kind of thinking in the transcripts and statements of witnesses from both the companies and regulators in terms of what they thought about the risks of their own actions. My belief is that we'll discover practically no one took the idea of a downside scenario seriously at all.

Northern Observer

I beg to differ.
Well it is true that the government may be in a state of confusion regarding the best step forward from a policy perspective on financial matters, I would say that it is the free market commentariat, academics and assorted intellectuals that are in a state of denial. Denial that anything went wrong, that incentives were peverse, that consequences were not bad enough, that looting and fraud were endemic, etc...
A key point.
Too many of the top financial managers are paid f-y money; money that if it all goes pear shape, they can quietly sell off, move to a low cost jurisdiction like Alabama or Maine and quietly spend the rest of their days fishing or gentleman farming. As long as the pay is that good you are going to get recklessness, their is no real downside, the way a worker faces downside when they lose their employment. If incentives are important, the fear of poverty and deprevation for not doing a good job, then they are doubly important at the top as opposed to the bottom of the firm. It has been the growing cushioning of the top members of the firm that has neutered the effect of "real life" incentives that most people understand very well. I often think that free market academics, because they are academics and are paid from institutions and have good benefits, have a blind spot with regard to executive incentives, since they too are protected from the free market.

The symptoms are an executive class separate from the owners (ie shareholders) who take unwise risks today in order to meet the sales bonus for the end of the year instead of projecting the health and well being of the firm into the endless future. The quick buck artist rules the roost. This is hardly suprising to anyone who has studied neoclassical economics. The separation of managers from owners is inherently dangerous to the health of the firm. The best policy comment I have heard so far is to make senior management put a large part of their personal net worth into the firm that will only be retreavable years after they have left, say a decade. The same goes for bonuses. All large compensations must be tied to long term performance or they are useless. If it goes to the CEOs estate so be it, who said life was fair, but if financial firms don't get their incentives right, they will die, for this crisis they have been bailed out but I feel that this will never happen again, the public wont stand for it.

Re: Northern Observer,

"Too many of the top financial managers are paid f-y money; money that if it all goes pear shape, they can quietly sell off, move to a low cost jurisdiction like Alabama or Maine and quietly spend the rest of their days fishing or gentleman farming."

and

"The separation of managers from owners is inherently dangerous to the health of the firm."

Bonuses were not all paid in cash. For bankers and traders, a significant portion, if not most, of their compensation was in form of stocks. The managers were not separated from owners - they were shareholders too, and lost much of their net worth because of the financial crisis.

ddebenham@langmichener.ca

Financial Regulatory Reform

When considering regulatory reform, is it not sensible to simply compare those jurisdictions which suffered from regulatory failure from those that did not, and then close the gap? From a Canadian perpective we immediately noted two differences from our American cousins that appeared to play a role in our relsilience to this particular crisis: (1) we do not have mortgage deductibility for homeowners, so there is no inherent preference to over-leverage our homes and (2) we regulate our banks and insurance companies on a functional basis such that anyone who acts like either institution is regulated as such, with the result that there was no 'unfair' competition between regulated and unregulated forms of banking and insurance that promoted "undue" risk taking. The side effect of a lack of competition was perhaps higher banking and insurance profits in oligopolistic markets, but it also made the difference in interest rates and mortgage rates such that homeowners in Canada underleveraged their homes and paid their mortgages off first rather than last. What's your take on the fact that Canada has hitherto whethered this financial crisis relatively successfully despite the usually superior performance of the American economy, and does our success offer any guidance for American regulatory reform?

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